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Abstract
The twenty-first century has ushered in demand by some
Americans for annoyancetech devices—novel electronic gadgets that
secretly fend off, punish, or comment upon perceived antisocial and
annoying behaviors of others. Manufacturers, marketers, and users
of certain annoyancetech devices, however, face potential tort
liability for personal and property damages suffered by the targets
of this “revenge by gadget.” Federal, state, and local policymakers
should start the process of coming to pragmatic terms with the
troubling rise in the popularity of annoyancetech devices. This is an
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area of social policy that cries out for thoughtful and creative
legislative solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION: FASCINATING NEW AND TROUBLING VIGILANTE
TECHNOLOGIES
Technology is a two-edged sword: new machines, devices,
processes, contrivances, appliances, tools, and gizmos can bring
benefits; but there are negative consequences to boot.1 Indeed, at
one time the federal government funded an Office of Technology
Assessment (“OTA”) (now defunct) that studied new and emerging
technologies and issued reports on how to manage and regulate
these cutting edge tools.2
It is fundamental, of course, that at least since the early years of
the twentieth century, tort law has imposed liability on
manufacturers, sellers, and users of products (whether new or old).
Under theories of warranty, intentional torts, negligence, and strict
liability (of one sort or the other), tort law has awarded damages to
victims of technology gone awry or misused.3
A beguiling recent development, however, raises interesting legal
See generally EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (1996) (discussing several types of mechanical, chemical,
biological, and medical technological innovations with negative unintended consequences); see
also JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE 265–71 (1989) (discussing the paradoxes and
unanticipated impacts of human attempts to control the environment); Robert F. Blomquist,
Legal Perspectives on Cloning: Cloning Endangered Animal Species?, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 383,
410–16 (1998) (discussing the pros and cons of an aggressive policy of government cloning of
endangered animal species).
2 The Office of Technology Assessment was created in 1972 as an analytical arm of
Congress.
Wikipedia.org,
Office
of
Technology
Assessment,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Technology_Assessment (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
The basic purpose of the OTA was to help members of Congress better anticipate and plan for
the consequences of technological change and to examine the intended and unintended ways
that the new technologies affect people’s lives. Id. The OTA was eliminated by Congress in
1995. Id. At its most active period during the 1980s, OTA had “studies under way in nine
program areas: energy and materials; industry, technology, and employment; international
security and commerce; biological applications; food and renewable resources; health;
communication, and information technologies; oceans and environment; and science,
education, and transportation.” U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION AND INDUSTRIAL
EFFICIENCY PUB. NO. OTA-INTE-317 (back inside cover) (1986) (on file with author).
3 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963) (recognizing
an injured man’s claim for strict product liability predicated on a manufacturing defect that
caused him personal injuries when he was using a power tool that his wife had purchased for
him; the court concluded that the plaintiff should not be forced to seek recovery against the
manufacturer under the less attractive law of warranties); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
111 N.E. 1050, 1051–53 (N.Y. 1916) (holding, in an opinion authored by Judge Cardozo, that
the plaintiff automobile driver could sue the manufacturer for negligence even though there
was no privity of contract between the parties).
1

OF
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questions.
In an August 2007 Wall Street Journal article,
innocuously placed in the “Weekend Journal” section, readers
learned of “the growing ranks of electronic vigilantes” who have
started to deploy novel gadgetry to secretly fend off, punish, or
comment upon annoying behavior of their fellow Americans.4
“Thanks to the falling cost of microcontroller chips and the lure of
easy online sales, inventors are turning out record numbers of
gadgets. One growing subset of these inventions: products that help
people neutralize antisocial behavior at the push of a button.”5
Who are the purveyors of these new anti-antisocial behavior
contraptions?
“The brains behind these devices range from
entrepreneurs in suburban Los Angeles to graduate students at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.”6
Some examples are
illuminating: (1) “A Tennessee company has created a $50 device
that shuts up other people’s dogs by answering their barks with an
ultrasonic squeal that humans can’t hear,” and is deceptively
inserted in a backyard birdhouse;7 (2) “British inventors are
exporting a new product for people who hate lousy drivers—it’s a
luminescent screen that fits in a car’s rear window and, at the
driver’s command, flashes one of five messages to other motorists”
including “Back Off,” “Idiot,” “a sad face,” a happy face and—not yet
widely disseminated, but demanded by some purchasers of the
screen—“offensive hand gestures”;8 (3) MIT’s Media Lab, which has
coined the new word “annoyancetech” has developed a “‘No-Contact
Jacket’ that, when activated with a controller, delivers a blast of
electricity to anyone who touches the person wearing it”;9 (4) the
“Annoy-a-tron,” designed for simple revenge by allowing a user to
hide the device under the desks of one’s enemies with the device

Jennifer Saranow, Revenge by Gadget, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2007, at W1.
Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. The product, known as the “Outdoor Bark Control Birdhouse” was developed “by
accident.” Indeed:
Though the technology has been around for five years, the manufacturer, Radio Systems
of Knoxville, Tenn., initially sold it as an indoor training tool for pet owners. But the
company says it began getting requests from customers for an outdoor version that could
be used on annoying neighborhood dogs. When a market analysis showed 60% of
consumers would welcome a covert way to shut up somebody else’s canine, the company
decided to proceed. . . . After flirting with fake rocks and footballs [to camouflage the
device], the company settled on a somewhat unlikely design—a brightly painted
Bavarian-style birdhouse.
Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. “During a demonstration in Japan . . . [the device] drew interest from women who
were eager to retaliate against gropers on the subway.” Id.
4
5
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emitting “a loud, piercing little beep”;10 (5) a specially revamped
iPod which silences annoying FM radio stations in taxicabs;11 (6)
“TV-B-Gone,” “a $20 handset that allows people to shut off loud
televisions in public places like doctor’s offices and bars”;12 (7)
“cellphone [sic] jammers”;13 (8) “the Mosquito,”—marketed by a firm
called “Kids Be Gone”—which “emits high-frequency sounds
particularly irritating to congregations of teenagers”;14 and (9) an
invention called the “‘I-Bomb’ that emits an electromagnetic pulse
that disables all electronics in its range (a similar device was
depicted in the movie ‘Ocean’s Eleven’)”15 and that, for instance,
could be used to shut down a neighbor playing loud music on her
stereo.
Yet—apparently unexamined at this writing—the manufacturers,
marketers, and users of certain annoyancetech devices face possible
liability for various tort causes of action by those who are the
10 Revenge
in
the
Form
of
the
Annoy-a-tron,
http://www.coolestgadgets.com/20070130/revenge-in-the-form-of-the-annoy-a-tron/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
According to this Web site:
Some people are just annoying and deserve to be messed with for whatever
reason. . . . The Annoy-a-tron serves a simple purpose: to annoy someone or even a whole
group of people. It’s extremely small [a little larger than a quarter] . . . and even has a
built in magnet to help you hide it. Once in place, you can set your Annoy-a-tron to emit
a 2 kHz, 12 kHz (this is the more cruel setting), or an alternating sound every few
minutes. . . . Intervals range from 2 to 8 minutes; your target will never know when the
next beep will come! Slowly but surely, you’ll defeat your enemy, or maybe the battery
will just run out, but that’ll be a good 3–4 weeks.
Id.
11 Saranow, supra note 4, at W1.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.; see also Mary Hanna, Fighting Fire with Fire, DAILY REV. (Hayward, Cal.), Aug. 22,
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 16385507 (“Gone are the days when we simply ask someone to
turn down the volume [of music or a TV or dog] and he complies with an apology. We seem to
find fighting excessive noise with gadgets to be safer then [sic] confronting people, what with
the prevalence of Intermittent Explosive Disorder, which used to be called having a short
fuse. What if you ask your neighbor to quiet his dog and he goes all postal on you? Next
thing you know he’ll be training the pooch to jump the fence and attack you.”); Robot
Vigilante Homemade ‘Bum Bot’ Patrols Area near Atlanta Bar at Night, AUGUSTA CHRON.
(Ga.), Apr. 23, 2008, at B7 (describing an invention of a bar owner that patrols an Atlanta
neighborhood and is controlled by the bar owner with a wireless remote control, the “Bum
Bot” is equipped with bright red lights, a blazing spotlight, an infrared video camera, and a
water cannon on the spinning turret on top, warning vagrants through a loudspeaker that
they are trespassing); Arthur H. Rotstein, Groups Use Camera to Keep Watchful Eye on
Border, ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR (Cal.), Apr. 19, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 7366001
(describing border vigilante groups that watch the U.S. southern border with Mexico and
make video recordings of suspects); Paige Wiser, Annoyance Is Mother of Today’s Inventions,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at 17 (“The hottest area for inventors is known as
‘annoyancetech’—stealth gadgets for cranky people. Now, they like to be called ‘electronic
vigilantes.’”).
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intended or foreseeable targets of these evolving electronic vigilante
technologies. My overarching purpose in the remainder of this very
brief overview article is to sketch possible tort causes of action by
plaintiffs harmed by annoyancetech devices and potential defenses
to these annoyancetech torts.
First, in Part II, various
annoyancetech tort causes of action are discussed.16 Then, in Part
III, potential assorted annoyancetech tort defenses are analyzed.17
Finally, in Part IV, public policy implications of annoyancetech
manufacturing, marketing, and use are considered.18
II. ANNOYANCETECH TORT CAUSES OF ACTION
We live in a world full of annoying behaviors. No doubt, from

See infra notes 19–39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 40–74 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 75–102 and accompanying text. This article will bypass a discrete and
growing area of electronic vigilantism—cyber-vigilantism involving computers. There are
swelling reports of this emerging social trend. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Campaign ‘08: GayMarriage Backers Allege Web Mischief in California, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2008, at A8
(“Opponents of California’s proposed ban on gay marriage claim their Web site was shut down
by a coordinated computer attack, amid rising tensions over one of the nation’s most
controversial ballot measures” involving an electronic vigilante “‘denial of service’ attack”);
China’s Online Vigilantes: Virtual Carnivores, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2008, at 47 (describing
“[h]uman-flesh searching” in China, also known as “crowdsourcing” in English-speaking
countries, that involves posting personal information of those perceived to have done or said
something wrong by “internet vigilantes”); B.J. Lee, Death by Web Posts, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 27,
2008, at 51 (reporting that an unsubstantiated rumor about a South Korean actress and
singer, spread “among hundreds of thousands of chat-room users,” led the woman to hang
herself from the stress); Sue Shellenbarger, Cyberbully Alert: Web Sites Make It Easier to
Flag Trouble, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2008, at D1 (describing how social networking sites have
made it easier to report cyber-vigilantism involving computers). Legal scholars have
addressed cyber-vigilantism in recent articles. See, e.g., Michael A. Fisher, The Right to
Spam? Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 363, 399–400 (2000)
(discussing anti-spamming vigilante revenge on the internet in reaction to cyber spamming);
Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1377 (2008) (describing, among
other phenomena, web-surfing vigilantes who seek embarrassing information about neighbors
they want to chase out of town); Monica R. Shah, The Case for a Statutory Suppression
Remedy to Regulate Illegal Private Party Searches in Cyberspace, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 250,
250–51 (2005) (describing vigilante computer hackers who gain access to an individual’s
private information and use or disseminate this information); Richard Warner, Spam and
Beyond: Freedom, Efficiency, and the Regulation of E-mail Advertising, 22 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141, 142 (2003) (discussing “lewd and annoying electronic messages
that can flood [computer] user mailboxes and cripple networks” and cause “a wicked
backlash” including “vigilante action”). Moreover, this article will also bypass a newlyemerging technological vigilante trend—and accompanying potential tort liability—involving
the manufacturing, marketing, and use of products by motorists to block government cameras
that capture the license plate numbers of traffic offenders like photo-blocking clear-plastic
print and Web sites, like Trapster.com, that allow the motorist to see and update a
computerized map of government roadway cameras. See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Get the
Feeling You’re Being Watched? If You’re Driving, You Just Might Be, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27,
2009, at A1 (discussing traffic cameras and motorist vigilante technology).
16
17
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time to time, every human being annoys others. For the most part,
tort law seeks to bypass trifles, bad manners, bothersome and pesky
human behavior—at least if the behavior is unintentional, sporadic,
and minor. But discerning what is a mere trifle, on the one hand,
and what is tortious harm, on the other hand, can sometimes be
difficult.
The term “tort”—derived from Latin roots meaning “twisted”—
suggests that “tortious conduct is twisted conduct, conduct that
departs from [social] norm[s].”19 So, broadly speaking, “torts are
traditionally associated with wrongdoing in some moral sense.”20
Indeed, tort theorists have engaged in a dynamic, ongoing debate
over the past half-century between those who espouse economic
efficiency grounds of tort liability, on the one hand,21 and others
who have argued “that the foundations of tort law rest[] more firmly
on moral ground.”22 As Professor Dan Dobbs cogently notes, “[i]n
the great majority of cases today, tort liability is grounded in the
conclusion that the wrongdoer was at fault in a legally recognizable
way.”23
Legal fault, in the law of torts, is traditionally grouped into two
categories: (1) intentional wrongs and (2) negligent wrongs.24 “Most
commonly, the intentional tort defendant is consciously aware of his
wrongdoing [and] he is always aware of his act.”25 Negligent wrongs
entail unreasonably risky behaviors that actually result in harm.
1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (2001).
Id.
21 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 3–4 (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 1 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–68 (7th ed.
2007); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1–4 (1987); Guido Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500–01 (1961);
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabilty:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093–94 (1972); R. H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18–19 (1960); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 851–52 (1981); C. Robert Morris,
Jr., Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process—The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE
L.J. 554, 555 (1961); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33
(1972).
22 David G. Owen, Foreword to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 2 (David G.
Owen ed., 1995); see also, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 276–312 (1986); CHARLES FRIED,
AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 2 (1970); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 2–3 (1995);
Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 259–60
(1976); Jules L. Coleman, On the Moral Argument for the Fault System, 71 J. PHIL. 473, 474
(1974); Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 37, 37
(1983); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 268–74 (1980).
23 1 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 2 (emphasis added).
24 Id.
25 Id.
19
20
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“The defendant in the negligence case is sometimes aware that he is
taking unreasonable risks; he is always in violation of
reasonableness standards whether he is consciously aware of that
fact or not.”26
Strict liability torts, however, provide liability without fault
(typically involving forseeability of harm and blameworthy conduct)
for abnormally dangerous activities and defective products among
other categories. Theorists ascribe various policy reasons for
imposing strict liability—from better deterrence to more generous
compensation; from wide risk spreading to basic fairness.27
Given the aforementioned background principles, what would be
the nature of the potential fault-based and strict liability-based
wrongs suffered by a victim of annoyancetech electronic
vigilantism?
First, on a very general level, the impalpable
autonomy of an individual to live as he or she deems fit—however
eccentric or bothersome—is challenged, and possibly violated, by
someone who seeks to punish or control another for a barking dog,
poor driving, unwanted television or radio noise, or irritating teens.
Second, the dignity of a target of annoyancetech vigilantism may be
sullied. This dignitary interest is intangible and addresses the
emotional distress and insult that a victim of electronic vigilantism
might experience at the loss of freedom and the underhanded
subjugation to the will of another person. Third, a victim of
annoyancetech measures could very possibly experience diminished
enjoyment or hedonic impairment in using his or her property (pets,
cell phones, stereos, televisions, and electrical appliances) by
devices that shut down, silence, or interfere with the property.
Fourth, after being the victim of electronic vigilantism—and
discovering the particular facts regarding the nature of the
annoyancetech device and how it was used by the perpetrator—a
person might experience anxiety that a similar stealth interference
with his or her life enjoyment might happen in the future. Fifth,
the victim of annoyancetech vigilantism may experience unpleasant
stress at having his or her privacy breached by another who
electronically tampers with one’s seclusion. Sixth, casualties of
electronic annoyancetech, when discovering that another has taken
self-help measures because of perceived antisocial behavior (loud
music, public cell phone usage, barking dogs) may experience
reputational distress if the incident is reported or publicized.

26
27

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 964–68.
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Seventh, targets of annoyancetech vigilantism may, of course, incur
tangible economic loss: of the health or death of a pet who has been
silenced by electronic pulses; of the health or death of a teenager
who has been accosted by electronic sounds; of the proper
functioning of cell phones, televisions, stereos and other electronic
appliances that have been electronically tampered with; of lost
business opportunities that come about because a PowerPoint sales
pitch at a convention was shut down or an important commercial
call was dropped.
Users of annoyancetech devices would, in most cases, be at fault
for intent-based conduct. They would have the purpose of silencing
a dog, dispersing teenagers, shutting down electronic devices, and
the like; doubtful cases would still seem easy marks for the
substantial certainty prong of intent.28 In instances where nontarget annoyances are impacted by annoyancetech devices
(collateral damage so to speak), transferred-intent would likely lead
to liability of intentional torts (with the exception of the tort of
outrage which does not transfer).29 Potential tort causes of action
would include assault,30 battery,31 trespass to chattels,32
conversion,33 and even intentional infliction of emotional distress
(outrage).34 An action for invasion of privacy based on intrusion
upon seclusion or private affairs is possible if annoyancetech tactics
by a tort defendant involve making video or sound recordings of a
person from a private space.35 Since the scope and sweep of an
electronic annoyancetech device could forseeably harm non-targets

28 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (“The defendant has an intent to achieve
a specified result when the defendant either (1) has a purpose to accomplish that result or (2)
lacks such a purpose but knows to a substantial certainty that the defendant’s action will
bring about the result.”). 1 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 48 (footnote omitted).
29 The doctrine of transferred intent “holds that if the defendant intended to cause any one
of five trespassory torts,” descended from the old English writ of trespass (assault, battery,
false imprisonment, trespass to chattels, and trespass to land), “then the defendant ‘intended’
to cause any invasion within that range of actions that befalls either the intended victim or a
third party.” VINCENT R. JOHNSON, MASTERING TORTS 19 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter JOHNSON,
MASTERING]. But see Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Tort Law, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 903, 908–10 (2004) (arguing that courts should be cautious about applying the
doctrine of transferred intent to third-parties not known by the defendant to be present).
30 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21, 32 (1965).
31 § 13.
32 §§ 217–18.
33 § 222A.
34 § 46.
35 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). According to § 652B, an action for
intrusion upon seclusion will lie if the defendant commits an intentional intrusion (physical
or otherwise) upon solitude, seclusion or private affairs that would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.
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in closely packed urban and suburban neighborhoods, the tort of
negligence would also exist as a theory of liability for non-target
plaintiffs and target plaintiffs to deploy against annoyancetech
electronic vigilantes.
Moreover, electronic vigilante users of
annoyancetech devices could conceivably be held liable for
abnormally-dangerous strict liability. In this regard, judges, who
undertake question of law calculations of whether or not particular
uses of annoyancetech devices are “abnormally dangerous” under
section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,36 might readily
conclude that activities like electronically silencing a neighbor’s dog,
dispersing a group of teenagers, shutting down a television, cutting
off a cell phone conversation, or scolding a motorist triggers a
preponderance of the six factors.
Strict liability for using
annoyancetech could plausibly be based on the following section 520
factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common
usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed
by its dangerous attributes.37
Manufacturers, sellers, and marketers of annoyancetech devices
would face potential liability for purveying defective products based
on strict liability for failure to warn the user of untoward
consequences of the devices to third parties and their property.
Moreover, annoyancetech devices might be prime candidates for
product-category strict liability because the dangers of having the
product on the market outweigh its utility.38 On the other hand, to
the extent that electronic vigilantism is viewed by a court as being
justified in a particular case, annoyancetech purveyors could assert
that the devices, like guns, do what they were designed to do and
§ 520.
§ 520(a)–(f).
38 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 301 (N.J. 1983) (holding, in a strict
product liability tort suit for injuries suffered when plaintiff dove into an above-ground
swimming pool, that the jury could conclude that the product was so dangerous and of so little
utility that it should not have been marketed at all).
36
37
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should not subject purveyors of the devices to strict tort product
liability.39
III. ANNOYANCETECH TORT DEFENSES
A. Intentional Torts and Negligence Defenses
The justificatory success of tort defendants who intentionally or
negligently cause personal, property, or emotional harm to others by
using electronic annoyancetech devices will depend on a hodgepodge
of what can usefully be called self-help legal doctrines and
principles. These self-help legal constructs, in turn, can be divided
into three parts: (1) traditional intentional tort defenses, (2)
traditional negligence tort defenses and barriers, and (3) analogical
self-help defenses.
1. Traditional Intentional Tort Defenses
Tort suits based on purposeful use of annoyancetech electronic
devices have eight traditional tort defenses that are theoretically
applicable: (1) self-defense, (2) defense of others, (3) private
necessity, (4) public necessity, (5) defense of property, (6) unlawful
conduct, (7) consent, and (8) general justification.
First, considering the privilege of self-defense, annoyancetech
vigilantes would probably flounder in their attempt to use this
defense because the typical use of annoyancetech devices is
retaliatory in nature, stemming from frustration at the relatively
trifling conduct of others.40 Furthermore, the privilege of selfdefense requires reasonable force under the circumstances; conduct
by others like verbal threats, however, is legally insufficient to
trigger the self-defense privilege.41 Accordingly, if verbal threats
are not an appropriate predicate for lawful exercise of the privilege,
unthreatening and merely annoying behavior that has no tendency
to suggest imminent bodily harm would likely be insufficient to
justify electronic reaction.
Second, defense of others, for reasons similar to our consideration
of the privilege of self-defense, is a weak defense for annoyancetech
users who cause harm to others. In most cases, the vigilante
annoyancetech user would be using the technology not because she

39
40
41

See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
Retaliation destroys the self-defense privilege. 1 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 160.
Id.
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reasonably believed that force was necessary to protect another
from physical harm, but because the annoyancetech user wants to
punish another for what the user perceives as antisocial conduct.42
Third, a privilege of private necessity may exist if it is apparently
necessary for one to invade the interests of the plaintiff in order to
prevent greater harm.43 In all but the most extreme situations (a
neighbor’s continuously barking dog that prevents sleep and is not
stopped by police intervention, or a blaring television set in a
physician’s waiting room that is out of reach and will not be tuned
down by office staff), engaging in self-help annoyancetech measures
would not be protected by the privilege of private necessity.44
Fourth, the privilege of public necessity, for reasons similar to my
private necessity analysis, would be of no avail to an annoyancetech
vigilante in all but the most extreme of situations.45
Fifth, while a possessor of property may use reasonable force to
defend property,46 it would be difficult to fathom legitimate
annoyancetech defenses based on this privilege.
Sixth, some states provide for a privilege of unlawful conduct to
bar recovery for an intentional tort.47 At first blush, this defense
might be attractive to a user of annoyancetech devices who is sued
in tort by plaintiffs who own barking dogs, who are bad drivers of
automobiles, and who are other technical law breakers. On closer
examination, however, the defense would likely not prove effective
for the annoyancetech user because it requires that (a) the conduct
constitutes a serious violation of the law and (b) the injuries for
which recovery is sought were a direct result of that violation.48
Irksome driving (including tailgating, changing lanes without
signals, driving below the speed limit), for example, would not be
considered a serious violation of the law (whereas speeding at a
high rate of speed or drunken driving might); harboring one barking
dog, by way of further example, would likely be viewed as a minor
violation of a disturbing the peace ordinance (but keeping multiple
continuously barking dogs might be deemed a serious legal

Id. (noting that retaliation is not permitted in defense of others).
The privilege of private necessity, however, “can only be invoked when the defendant is
threatened, or reasonably appears to be threatened with serious harm and the response is
reasonable in the light of the threat.” Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 170.
47 JOHNSON, MASTERING, supra note 29, at 61.
48 Id.
42
43
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violation).49
Seventh, a privilege of consent50 could conceivably apply to
certain annoyancetech tort actions if notice of the device was
provided. Thus, by way of analogy to a property owner who posts a
warning sign, such as “Beware of Dog” (or lines his perimeter fence
with barbed wire), we might imagine a property owner posting a
warning sign that a “Kids Be Gone” device for irritating
neighborhood congregations of teenagers or an ultrasonic squeal
device for barking dogs was on the premises. Under the principle of
volenti non fit injuria, whereby one who deliberately confronts a
known danger thereby manifests consent, neighborhood dog owners
and neighborhood teenagers (and their parents) might be precluded
from recovering for intentional torts against the annoyancetech
vigilante.
Finally, under a general justification defense, whereby the law of
torts recognizes privileges under new and changing circumstances,
we might see a lawyer in a future annoyancetech intentional tort
suit make the following illustrative creative argument—“my client
alerted the police on numerous occasions about the loud barking
dogs of the plaintiff who sues for trespass to chattels. No fines were
assessed. The local government did not take the matter seriously.”
The lawyer might close by contending: “My client used the
ultrasonic squeal device as a last resort to obtain some peace and
quiet at an affordable price.”51

49 See, e.g., Mary Owen & Sheila Burt, Barking to be Ticketed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 2008, at
35 (describing the frequent “loud barking” of an Illinois homeowner’s neighbor’s three
German Shepherds, leading the village of Homer Glen to pass an ordinance whereby “owners
of animals that make loud noises for longer than 15 minutes” are fined after a second
complaint up to $100, and after a third complaint up to $750). Query: would a fourth
violation of the Homer Glen ordinance be considered a “serious” violation of law sufficient to
provide a tort defense for a neighbor using an electronic dog device?
50 Apparent consent or actual consent might conceivably apply.
JOHNSON, MASTERING,
supra note 29, at 48.
51 The problem with this general justification ploy—which conceptually requires a showing
that the defendant’s conduct was acceptable under the circumstances—is that an
annoyancetech defendant would not be seeking to apprehend a so-called antisocial wrongdoer.
Instead, the defendant’s conduct would likely be viewed as retribution not reasonably
calculated to protect the defendant’s person or property when other feasible alternative
courses of action—such as calling the police, asking the plaintiff to moderate antisocial
behavior, or suing in nuisance—would be available. Cf. Sindle v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 307
N.E.2d 245, 247–48 (N.Y. 1973) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not
permitting the defendants to amend their answers to present evidence of justification where
one of the defendants, a school bus driver, drove unruly children to the police station when
some of the children continued to engage in acts of vandalism to the bus despite requests by
the defendant for the children to stop the serious misbehavior).
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2. Traditional Negligence Tort Defenses
In riposting against tort of negligence suits by tort plaintiffs who
claim personal or property damages caused by annoyancetech
devices, several potential considerations may come into play to limit
or abrogate liability.
First, issues of factual causation may call into question whether
or not the particular annoyancetech device was a substantial cause
of claimed damages.52 Second, while intervening criminal or
intentionally tortious conduct sometimes cuts off negligence liability
of a tortfeasor, manufacturers of annoyancetech devices would
likely be unprotected under such a theory because the very nature
of the devices are designed to be used by vigilantes who want to
punish annoying behavior of others.53 Third, since damages are an
essential element of the tort of negligence,54 plaintiffs may have
difficulty proving recoverable damages for relatively minor
interferences with their property occasioned by an annoyancetech
device. It is possible, however, that juries may award non-economic
damages for pain and suffering if they determine that a particular
annoyancetech device caused plaintiff to incur distress.55 Yet “most
courts hold that negligent harm to property, by itself, is an
insufficient predicate for an award of emotional-distress damages at
least if the harm occurs outside of the plaintiff’s presence and is the
result of mere negligence.”56 If, however, the gravamen of a
plaintiff’s negligence case is really negligent infliction of emotional
distress caused by an annoyancetech device, the plaintiff will
usually have to prove severe emotional distress, which is ordinarily
judged by an objective standard.57
Fourth—regarding defenses based on an annoyancetech plaintiff’s
conduct in negligence cases—in jurisdictions that have adopted
comparative negligence or comparative fault, the nature of a
plaintiff’s antisocial act that triggered the defendant’s use or
marketing of an annoyancetech device would be relevant to reduce
1 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 405.
Id. at 462.
54 Id. at 269.
55 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1050–51 (2001).
56 JOHNSON, MASTERING, supra note 29, at 180.
57 See, e.g., Lewis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 487 N.E.2d 1071, 1071–73 (Ill. 1985)
(holding that an ordinary person would not have suffered severe distress from being trapped
in an elevator for forty minutes; therefore, plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress was dismissed). But see Johnson v. Supersave Mkts., Inc., 686 P.2d 209,
213 (Mont. 1984) (finding that substantial indicia of emotional distress genuineness exists if
there has been a “substantial invasion of a legally protected interest”).
52
53
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(or bar) damages.58 Assumption of risk defenses would likely be
unavailable by a defendant sued by an annoyancetech victim—
express assumption of risk would not exist;59 primary implied
assumption of risk would falter in most case scenarios because of
the lack of a sport or game;60 secondary implied assumption of risk
would be inapplicable because of the lack of voluntariness in
annoyancetech victims in confronting a risk of harm from vigilante
use of electronic devices and the absence of manifested willingness
to relieve the user or marketer of these devices from obligations to
exercise reasonable care.61
3. Analogical Self-Help Defenses
Some kinds of self-help are permitted by the law whereby a party
is allowed to remedy a wrong by another without calling upon the
police or initiating legal proceedings.62 Examples in the realm of
commercial law include the right to repossess an automobile63 and
the right of a bank to setoff an account balance of a customer who
owes money to the bank.64 An important limitation of these
commercial self-help measures, however, is a prohibition against
JOHNSON, MASTERING supra note 29, at 230–31.
Express assumption of risk requires an agreement in advance between potential tort
parties whereby the plaintiff agrees with the defendant, prior to the harm, not to hold the
defendant liable for failure to exercise reasonable care. See, e.g., Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293
A.2d 821, 828 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (upholding an express release for negligence); Gross
v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (N.Y. 1979) (discussing the requirements of a valid pre-accident
release).
60 The primary assumption of risk doctrine holds that a defendant is under no tort duty to
protect a plaintiff from inherent risks in a particular sport or recreational activity. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 933 F.2d 470, 472–73 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying the
doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk to preclude a plaintiff’s claim for negligence
against a hotel for injuries received in a game of climbing a sliding board backwards);
Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967–69 (N.Y. 1986) (applying the doctrine of primary
implied assumption of risk to bar a horse-racing jockey’s claims for negligence against the
racetrack and another jockey).
61 See, e.g., Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 266 (Tex. 1974) (holding no secondary
implied assumption of risk by a plaintiff who was injured by defendant’s boar hog, since the
defendant was not entitled to force the plaintiff to surrender his rights to use his real
property by staying indoors to avoid the dangerous animal and because plaintiff’s
confrontation of the danger of being attacked by defendant’s hog was involuntary).
62 1 DOBBS, supra note 19, at 166–67.
63 Id. at 139, 189–90.
64 The United States Supreme Court has recognized a bank’s right of setoff multiple times.
See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (“The right of
setoff . . . allows entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each
other, thereby avoiding ‘the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.’” (quoting Studley
v. Boylston Nat’l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913))). Also, for a brief discussion and example of
a bank’s right to setoff against a depositor see Bank’s Right of Set-Off, 60 BANKING L.J. 4, 4–8
(1943).
58
59
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breaching the peace by causing a confrontation that could
conceivably lead to violence.65 A tort defendant who has used or
marketed annoyancetech devices would likely be viewed by courts
as breaching the peace by engaging in or enabling retributional
behavior against another likely to spur violence, if discovered by the
victim.
Some privileges to intentional tort actions are other candidates,
by analogy, for annoyancetech tort users or marketers. One is the
privilege to discipline. The argument by an annoyancetech tort
defendant would be that he used the electronic device to “discipline”
the plaintiff for antisocial activity (like harboring continuously
barking dogs, noisy parties late at night, or playing an obnoxious
television show or radio program in a public place). This argument,
however, would likely fail because the privilege of discipline has
been strictly limited by courts and legislators to apply only to
military discipline of military members66 and reasonable parental
discipline of minor children by those who are properly in charge of a
child’s care.67
65 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-609 (2008) (formerly U.C.C. § 9-503 (1977)); Eugene Mikolajczyk,
Comment, Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code—A Modern
Definition for an Ancient Restriction, 82 DICK. L. REV. 351, 355 (1977).
In implementing the self-help policies of protecting the debtor’s personal interests and
society’s prohibition against the use of force, courts have held that it is a breach of the
peace to effect repossession by the use of force directed against the debtor. Many courts
in cases of self-help repossession derived precedent from the criminal law definitions of
breach of peace.
The criminal law definitions of breach of peace is essentially oriented to the use or
threatened use of violence. Courts in self-help cases derive precedent from this
definition when violence occurs during the repossession. Unfortunately, however, at
least one court that applied the criminal law definition has determined that violence is a
“necessary” element to a finding of breach of peace. . . .
When the secured party’s method of repossession entails less than blatant violence,
the criminal law definition of breach of peace as a violence-oriented concept may no
longer be effective in protecting the debtor’s personal interest. Increasingly, the breach
of peace definition is analyzed from the tort perspective of harmful or offensive touching.
Id. at 355–56.
66 The Uniform Code of Military Justice governs the disciplinary rules of the Armed Forces
of the United States and provides for courts martial procedures and other military
punishments for various misbehaviors by military personnel. Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–1800 (2006); see also DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3–7 (7th ed. 2008).
67 Parents may apply the force or impose the confinement that they reasonably believe is
necessary for controlling or training their children. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147
(1965). Factors bearing on the reasonableness of parental discipline of children include: the
age of the child, the nature of the child’s misbehavior, the example to be set for other children
in the family, whether the parental punishment is necessary and appropriate to induce
obedience, and whether the behavior is disproportionate, unnecessarily degrading, or likely to
cause serious or permanent harm. § 150. The parental privilege to discipline children may be
extended to persons who are properly in charge of the children but who are not the actual

02 BLOMQUIST FORMATTED1.DOCX

70

12/18/2009 1:15 PM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 73.1

Another potential analogical intentional tort privilege that might
be of interest to annoyancetech tort defendants is the privilege of
citizen arrest. The argument by an annoyancetech defendant would
be that she used the electronic device on the plaintiff or the
plaintiff’s property to affect the functional equivalent of a citizen’s
arrest for the plaintiff’s antisocial conduct.
This argument,
however, would likely fail because of the severe limitations most
jurisdictions place on a citizen’s arrest, the likelihood that most
antisocial behavior would not be felonious, and the likely failure of a
defendant to show that use of an annoyancetech device was an
“arrest” as opposed to a vengeful act.68
B. Strict Liability Tort Defenses
Annoyancetech users and marketers defending against a strict
liability tort for harm caused by abnormally dangerous activities
would be hard-pressed to present evidence of any of the equitable
factors under Restatement principles. Those users and marketers
could argue that the likelihood of harm that results from most
annoyancetech devices would be low, and—although a stretch—that
the value to the community of punishing or abating antisocial
behavior, like barking dogs, loud teenagers, or obnoxious
televisions, outweighs the dangerous attributes of the vigilante
electronic devices.69 Under the reformulated abnormally-dangerous
provisions of the Third Restatement, however, annoyancetech
defendants could focus their argument on the lack of “physical
harm” provided as a more restrictive ambit of strict liability; most
annoyancetech scenarios would likely not involve physical harm to

parents of the children. § 147(2). Examples might include schools and teachers, child-care
providers, surrogate parents, and school bus drivers.
68 An arrest takes a person into custody for the purpose of bringing a person before a court
or police entity administering the law. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 127 (1965). The
privilege of a citizen’s arrest permits a private defendant to arrest a plaintiff in three
potential situations. First, the plaintiff has in fact committed the felony (serious crime) for
which he is arrested; second, someone has committed a felony and the defendant reasonably
suspects that the plaintiff is the person responsible; or third, the plaintiff has committed a
breach of the peace in the presence of the defendant. § 119.
Another analogical defense by a user of annoyancetech devices to a tort suit might be selfhelp to remedy a nuisance. See Jon K. Wactor, Note, Self-Help: A Viable Remedy for
Nuisance? A Guide for the Common Man’s Lawyer, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 98 (1982) (“[While
s]elf-help abatement of nuisance is an established principle of common law,” problems would
likely exist for an annoyancetech tort defendant because “breach of peace or unnecessary
damage cannot occur during the abatement attempt.” The annoyance uses examined in this
article would likely run afoul of these key limitations).
69 See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
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the plaintiff but, rather, harm to the plaintiff’s property
accompanied by purely non-physical emotional distress.70
Annoyancetech manufacturers and marketers defending against a
strict liability tort for product defects by a victim, who has suffered
damages because of someone’s use of an electronic device, would
likely face design defect claims based on an argument by plaintiffs
that the annoyancetech device flunks a risk/utility calculus or
failure-to-warn defect claims.71 The only feasible defense for
annoyancetech defendants is to argue that their products are
“unavoidably unsafe,” along the lines that knives, guns, alcohol, and
tobacco are dangerous by nature.72 Annoyancetech manufacturers
and marketers, however, are likely to be met with arguments by
plaintiffs that annoyancetech devices are manifestly too risky in the
light of the low—if not nonexistent—utility of the products.73 A
defense based on a defect warning for annoyancetech devices would
be logically flawed. Although “[w]hen a product is unavoidably
dangerous,” as virtually all annoyancetech devices would be, “a
warning permits the consumer to make informed choices whether to
accept the product,”74 it is the plaintiff victim in an annoyancetech
product strict liability action who would, by definition, be unable to
read warnings or make a choice.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Historical Problematics and Uses of Vigilante Justice
While Americans have become accustomed to public policing of
antisocial conduct since the mid-nineteenth century,75 “[t]he
70 The reformation of strict liability in the context of abnormally dangerous activities is as
follows:
(a) A defendant who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict
liability for physical harm resulting from the activity.
(b) An activity is abnormally dangerous if:
(1) The activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm
even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and
(2) The activity is not a matter of common usage.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001)
(emphasis added).
71 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
72 2 DOBBS, supra note 55, at 988–89; see also 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. k (1965).
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2, cmt. e (1998).
74 2 DOBBS, supra note 55, at 1005.
75 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO UNITED STATES HISTORY 603 (Paul S. Boyer ed., 2001). “In
colonial America, policing relied on community consensus and citizens’ service as constables
and in sheriffs’ posses. Public punishments were the most important means of encouraging
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American police tradition also includes private policing” and
vigilante justice movements.76 Lawrence Friedman discusses the
vigilante movement in the American West in conjunction with ad
hoc, privately-instituted “miners’ codes,” in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, as “[t]wo famous western institutions” of
privately-ordered frontier justice.77
The miners’ codes were little bodies of law adopted as
binding customs in western mining camps. The miners’
courts and codes resembled . . . the claim clubs of the
Midwest. These were [private] organizations of squatters
who banded together to control the outcomes of public land
auctions. The claim clubs also drew up rules and procedures,
to govern, record, and document the land claims of their
members. Such clubs flourished in Wisconsin in the late
1830s, in Iowa through the 1840s. There is some slight
evidence of connection between the claim clubs, miners’
groups in the Midwest (near Galena, Illinois, and in
southwestern Wisconsin), and the miners’ codes of the Far
West.78

conformity and order. Modern American police forces, patrols to prevent and detect crime
and maintain order, arose in the nineteenth century” as adaptations of English institutions.
Id. New York City’s police force, formed in 1845, is viewed as the first modern police force in
America, “modeled on London’s Metropolitan Police,” which was organized in 1829. Id.
Notably, New York City’s
policemen walked beats, and they had power to arrest without a warrant. They also
performed services such as rescuing lost children or animals or lodging the homeless
temporarily in station houses. Other [American] cities, and later small towns, followed
this model. . . .
....
By the early twentieth century, reformers emphasized professionalization, a more
military-style organization, higher educational standards, better training, concentration
on crime-fighting over general service, and freedom from politics.
However,
professionalization sometimes widened the distance between the police and local
communities.
Id. Advanced technology innovation was important to American police forces. “Mobility
evolved from walking the beat to horse-drawn patrol wagons . . . to motorcycles, automobiles,
and helicopters. Communications progressed from rapping a club on the street to radios and
computers.” Id. Moreover, “[i]nvestigative methods progressed from mug shots to up-to-date
crime labs . . . computerization, and DNA analysis.” Id.
76 Id. “Vigilante movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as the
vigilantes of early San Francisco or the Ku Klux Klan, expressed fear of outsiders or minority
groups.” Id. Moreover, “[f]ormal private police forces, like the Pennsylvania Coal and Iron
Police and the strikebreaking Pinkerton Detective Agency, founded in 1852 by Allan
Pinkerton, served industrialists’ interests in labor disputes.” Id.; see also EDWARD L. AYERS,
VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH
151–62 (1984) (discussing vigilante justice).
77 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 275 (3d ed. 2005).
78 Id. at 275. According to Friedman:
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Friedman’s account of the details of the American “vigilante
movement” of the late-nineteenth century notes that it “was more
flamboyant, and at times more sinister”79 than the private miners’
codes of the same period. As Friedman notes:
This was not exclusively a western phenomenon; but the
West was the vigilante heartland. The two San Francisco
Vigilance Committees, of 1851 and 1856, were early and
famous examples. These committees were “businessmen’s
revolutions” directed against corrupt, inept local
government. Those who supported the vigilantes considered
themselves decent citizens, using self-help, taking the law
into their own hands, striking out against violence,
corruption, and misrule in San Francisco. The city was
turbulent, anarchic; gold-hungry hordes had swollen its
population. The first committee began its work by arresting
a “desperate character” named Jenkins. He was given a kind
of trial, convicted and hanged from a heavy wooden
beam . . . . Other bad characters were simply told to get out of
town.80
Vigilante justice also existed in other western communities in the
late-nineteenth century including: Carson City, Nevada; Denver,
Colorado; Cheyenne and Laramie, Wyoming; Montana; and Idaho.81
While the “vigilante story” in the American West was at times
harsh, Friedman properly points out that there were logical reasons
for vigilante groups.82 “The vigilantes were often not really reacting
to a legal vacuum; they were fighting against a legal order that was
simply not to their liking. Not just weak justice, but justice that (in
the eyes of elites) was reaching the wrong results.”83 Indeed,
These miners’ codes were at least as old as the California gold rush, and were also found
in other parts of the West. . . . Many codes were reduced to written form. They set up
rough but workable rules and processes for recording claims, for deciding whose claim
was first, for settling disputes among claimants, and for enforcing decisions of miners’
“courts.” The Gregory Diggings ruled itself through its little legal system two years
before Colorado Territory was formally organized. The mining code served the function,
well known in American legal history, of a makeshift judicial and political order, in
places that were settled before ordinary government institutions arrived. Other mining
districts copied the Gregory code. . . . The Colorado territorial legislature in 1861 and
1862 ratified, with a broad sweep, the local claims and judgments these informal courts
had rendered.
Id. (emphasis added).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 275–76 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
81 Id. at 276–77.
82 Id. at 277.
83 Id.
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another legal scholar confirmed this view, noting that American
late-nineteenth-century “vigilantism was not really a ‘pre-law
phenomenon,’ a ‘groping towards the creation of legal institutions,’
but more accurately a ‘reaction against the corruption, weakness, or
delays’ of the established legal order.”84
“In any event, social control, like nature, abhors a vacuum. The
‘respectable’ citizens—the majority, perhaps?—in western towns
were not really lawless.”85 To the contrary, “[t]hey were Americans;
they were unwilling to tolerate too sharp a break in social
continuity; they reacted against formal law that was too slow, or too
corrupt, for their purposes . . . . [They] were products of a culture
clash, in small communities” of an emerging nature.86
B. Twenty-First-Century Extreme American Neighborhood Trends
In a recent article, I uncover a troublesome trend of inept, slow,
and potentially corrupt police, and formal legal control of
neighborhood disputes.87 My research uncovered instances where
land use or boundary disputes dragged on for years,88 cases of police
response to neighborhood arguments that culminated in police
violence and abuse,89 and instances of recurring retaliation and
taunting by out-of-control neighbors angered at a neighbor’s
behavior.90
Are we seeing a level of frustration by twenty-first-century
Americans that matches the historical pattern of American
frustration with the formal governments and laws of the latenineteenth century that culminated in vigilante justice?91 Could the
demand for, and development and recent popularity of, revengemotivated annoyancetech electronic devices be a logical
manifestation of American frustration with the ability or
willingness of public police forces and formal legal processes to
adequately manage antisocial neighborhood misbehavior involving
loud animals, unruly children, wild parties, and the like?

84 Id. at 276–77 (quoting Willard Hurst, The Uses of Law in Four ‘Colonial’ States of the
American Union, 1945 WIS. L. REV. 577, 585 (1945)).
85 Id. at 277.
86 Id.
87 Robert F. Blomquist, Extreme American Neighborhood Law, 45 GONZ. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
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C. Some Sociological Perspectives
Pending more robust case histories regarding the demand for
production and use of annoyancetech electronic devices to respond
to perceived antisocial behaviors in neighborhoods and public places
(which case studies would enable comparative and longitudinal
analyses), a few sociological musings are in order.
Under the so-called frustration-aggression theory, human
“aggressive behavior results when purposeful activity is
interrupted.”92 A related theory of aggression focuses on social
learning to behave in accordance with norms of violence because
individuals come to view aggression as giving rise to positive utility
or gain through approval by others, prestige, or economic reward.93
Demand for annoyancetech electronic vigilante devices might fit
both types of aggression theory: first, Americans might be
frustrated in having their peace and quiet significantly interrupted,
and, second, electronic-savvy devotees (accustomed to computers,
portable communication devices, and other modern contraptions)
might have learned that electronic technologies can quickly and
efficiently meet their needs.94
Demand for and use of annoyancetech electronic devices also
implicates social norm theory, particularly dynamic models of social
interaction (with a focus on negotiation of roles and social
meanings), ethnomethodology, and post-modern philosophy.95 The
writing of Erving Goffman may be helpful in understanding why
people might be attracted to a non-dramaturgical, non-interactive
approach to resolving social conflict by anonymously deploying
technology to “solve” perceived antisocial behavior of others instead
of publicly complaining and frontally negotiating a resolution to a
social problem.96 Perhaps the desire for anonymously deployed
A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 12 (Gordon Marshall ed., 2009) [hereinafter SOCIOLOGY].
Id. at 11–12.
94 A related sociological topic of interest is “new technology” defined as “[a]ny set of
productive techniques which offers a significant improvement (whether measured in terms of
increased output or savings in costs) over the established technology for a given process in a
specific historical context.” Id. at 513.
95 See FRANCESCA CANCIAN, WHAT ARE NORMS? A STUDY OF BELIEFS AND ACTION IN A
MAYA COMMUNITY 106–09 (1975) (discussing both Parsonsian static conformist norm
conceptions and dynamic social identity theories of norms that emphasize personal identity so
that persons conform to norms to demonstrate to themselves and to others that they are a
particular kind of person).
96 Goffman was an influential micro-sociologist during the 1960s and 1970s that pioneered
the so-called dramaturgical perspective of sociology. Deploying a metaphor of the theater, he
was interested in the way that people “play” roles and manage the social impressions that
they present to others in different social settings, and how people interact when they are in
92
93
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annoyancetech devices can be understood as aberrant social
behavior—deviating from what is considered normal—that is
performed in secret and for reasons of self-interest, in contrast with
non-conforming behavior which refers to public violation of social
norms frequently done to promote social change (such as a political
or religious dissenter who relishes a proclamation of deviance to an
audience).97
Concepts of alienation—“the estrangement of individuals from
one another, or from a specific situation or process”98—are also
germane to our better understanding of the growing popularity of
annoyancetech devices. Psychological alienation—by those who feel
powerless and isolated from public sources of power and social
control like the police and the courts—might account for the
demand for these electronic vigilante devices.99
Related to concepts of alienation are sociological constructs of
anomie and anarchism. Anomie involves norm turbulence through
conflict, breakdown, or insufficient social norms.100 Anarchism—
beliefs that society functions better in the absence of government or
social authority, leading not to chaos but to spontaneous order—has
been influential in modern debate on topics that include communes,
decentralization, and federalism, trade union labor movements, and
Gandhi-inspired techniques of non-violent protest.101
Anomie
theory could explain how annoyancetech trends might be part of a
twenty-first-century breakdown in social norms of negotiated
conflict resolution through personal interaction, mediated by the
police and the courts.
Moreover, annoyancetech users and
marketers could be conceived of as participants in a web-inspired
electronic anarchy.
Annoyancetech can also be viewed as part of the “broken
windows” thesis of neighborhood social control that posits a

the presence of others. See ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE
PUBLIC ORDER 1–5 (1971) (offering a plethora of new sociological concepts that help the
understanding of the minute details of face-to-face social interactions); ERVING GOFFMAN,
THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 10–13 (1958) (outlining of his dramaturgical
framework).
97 See CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 28–31 (Robert K. Merton & Robert Nisbet eds.,
4th ed., 1971) (discussing different forms of social deviance).
98 SOCIOLOGY, supra note 92, at 14.
99 See JOHN TORRANCE, ESTRANGEMENT, ALIENATION AND EXPLOITATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL
APPROACH TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (1977) (discussing the philosophical, sociological, and
psychological facets of alienation).
100 See ANOMIE AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE 1–20 (Marshall B.
Clinard ed., 1964); MARCO ORRU, ANOMIE: HISTORY AND MEANINGS 118–20 (1987).
101 SOCIOLOGY, supra note 92, at 20–21.
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connection between public order and crime prevention.102 Under
this thesis, the most promising way to fight crime is to stop the
disorder that precedes it. Thus, a broken window in a building
might suggest to a pedestrian that no one cares about neighborhood
order which can theoretically mushroom from petty offenses like
rock-throwing to the breaking of more windows to serious crimes
like drug-dealing, robbery, and murder.
“Zero tolerance,”
neighborhood watch programs and community policing are the
usual iterations of the broken windows thesis of social control. But
it is potentially edifying to think of annoyancetech electronic
vigilantism against antisocial behavior as a more recent iteration.
V. CONCLUSION
The twenty-first century has ushered in demand by some
Americans for novel electronic gadgetry—called annoyancetech
devices—that secretly fend off, punish, or comment upon perceived
antisocial and annoying behaviors of their fellow citizens. The
manufacturers, marketers, and users of certain annoyancetech
devices, however, face possible tort liability under theories of
intentional, negligence, and strict liability torts for personal and
property damages suffered by the targets of this “revenge by
gadget.” While assorted potential defenses to tort liability for harm
from annoyancetech devices theoretically exist (traditional
international tort defenses, traditional negligence tort defenses, and
strict liability tort defenses), these tort defenses are weak and
problematic.
Federal, state, and local policymakers should start the process of
coming to pragmatic terms with the troubling rise in the popularity
of annoyancetech electronic devices. This is an area of social policy
that cries out for thoughtful and creative legislative solutions. In
grappling with this matter, American policymakers should consider
(1) the historical and problematic uses of vigilante justice; (2)
twenty-first-century extreme American neighborhood trends; and
(3) various sociological perspectives regarding human aggression,
norm theory, alienation, anomie, anarchism, and the “broken
windows thesis” of neighborhood control.

102 See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 19 (1996).

